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1.	 THE ANALOGY BETWEEN STATE IMMUNITY AND FUNCTIONAL IMMUNITY 
OF STATE ORGANS IN CASES WHERE INTERNATIONAL CRlMES HAVE BEEN 
COMMITTED 
The parallel or analogy that has at times been drawn - also in the Italian ju­
risprudence - between the immunity of States from foreign jurisdiction and the 
functional immunity of State officials, with specific reference to cases where an in­
ternational crime has allegedly been committed,' offers the opportunity to develop 
some considerations on current inconsistencies in the application ofsuch immunity 
rules. 
It is universally acknowledged, whatever theoretical perspective one may 
chose, that functional immunity cannot be invoked by a State official suspected of 
international crimes, whether before a domestic or an international court.' On the 
• Marie Curie Fellow (2010), European University Institute; Assistant Professor of 
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1 See, for instance, the reasoning of the Italian Court of Cassation in the Ferrini case: "One 
final point should be made. It is by now clear that, in the presence of international crimes, it 
is not possible to invoke the functional immunity of foreign State organs. Conventional law 
in this regard is unequivocal. [... ] According to prevailing opinion, functional immunity is a 
corollary of State immunity, since it satisfies the requirement of preventing that the prohibition 
on suing the foreign State can be frustrated by bringing proceedings directly against the person 
responsible for carrying out State activities. But if this is the case, as it seems to this Court, it 
must therefore be held that if functional immunity cannot be applied, because the act conducted 
constitutes an international crime, there can be no valid reason to maintain the immunity of the 
State and therefore to deny that its responsibility can be enforced before the judicial authority of 
a foreign State", Corte di Cassazione (Sez. Unite civili), Ferrini v.Federal Republic ofGermany, 
11 March 2004, No. 5044, RDI, 2004, p. 539 ff., International Law in Domestic Courts, ILDC 19 
(IT 2004), (www.oxfordlawreports.com).para.ll. ("E ormai pacifico che, in presenza di crimini 
internazionali, I'immunita funzionale degli organi dello Stato estero non puo essere invocata. La 
normativa convenzionale e, a tale riguardo, inequivoca [... ]. L'immunita funzionale, secondo 
l' opinione prevalente, costituisce specificazione di quella che compete agli Stati, poiche risponde 
all'esigenza di impedire che il divieto di convenire in giudizio 10 Stato straniero possa essere 
vanificato agendo nei confronti della persona mediante la quale la sua attivita si eesternata. Ma 
se il rilievo eesatto, come sembra a questa Corte, deve allora convenirsi con quanti affermano 
che se I'nnmunita funzionale non puo trovare applicazione, perche I'atto compiuto si configura 
quale crimine internazionale, non vi e alcuna valida ragione per tener ferma I'immunita dello 
Stato e per negare, conseguentemente, che la sua responsabilita possa essere fatta valere davanti 
all'autorita giudiziaria di uno Stato straniero"). 
2 CASSESE, International Criminal Law, 2nd ed., Oxford, 2008, p. 305 fI. 
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other hand, according to the prevailing opinion, for the very same act, the State on 
whose behalf the accused official was acting enjoys immunity from the civil juris­
diction of foreign States.' 
There is an inherent conflict or contradiction in this situation - as recognized by 
the Institut de Droit International in its Resolution adopted in September 20094 ­
for an individual that has acted in an official capacity may not invoke this situation 
as a defence, justification or excuse in a criminal trial before a competent tribunal 
of a foreign State, whereas the State on behalf of which the organ has acted - that 
could have tolerated, authorized or even organized the commission of the alleged 
crime - may invoke its sovereignty not to be subject to civil proceedings in foreign 
domestic courts. 
The lack of coherence becomes even more evident in common law countries 
where civil and criminal proceedings are completely separate and where incongru­
ity also concerns the functional immunity of State officials depending on whether 
it is invoked before a criminal or a civil court. A concrete example may better il­
lustrate the negative consequences of this separation. In the very well known Jones 
case, the House ofLords held that both Saudi Arabia and its organ Colonel Abdul­
Aziz were immune from the civil jurisdiction of English courts, by virtue of the 
State Immunity Act (SIA).5 But what would have happened ifColonel Abdul-Aziz 
was to be prosecuted before a criminal tribunal? He would have been tried on the 
assumption that being accused of acts of torture, he could not have relied on his 
capacity as State official to be exempt from jurisdiction. Actually, this is exactly 
what happened in Pinochet, where the House of Lords did not accept the plea of 
immunity of a former Head of State for alleged acts of torture and decided that it 
was possible to extradite him to Spain." Ifone shares the view oftreating differently 
the immunity plea ofa State official depending on the civil or criminal nature of the 
proceedings, there could hypothetically be a situation where the very same organ is 
immune from a civil suit but not from criminal jurisdiction for the same set offacts: 
this would create an objectionable discrepancy and it would undermine access to 
3 According to Fox, in the current structure of international law "there is no room for an 
exception to State immunity for acts in violation of international law," and these acts "may only 
be made subject to adjudication, whether by international or regional human rights or national 
tribunals, with the consent ofthe alleged wrongdoer State". Fox, The Law ofState Immunity, 2nd 
ed., Oxford, 2008, p. 141. 
4 INSTITUT DE DROIT IN1ERNATIONAL (Third Commission - Rapporteur: H. FOX), Resolution 
on the Immunity from Jurisdiction ofthe State and ofPersons Who Act on Behalfofthe State in 
case ofInternational Crimes, Naples, 10 September 2009 (available at: <http://www.idi-iil.org/ 
idiE/resolutionsE/2009_naples_Ol_en.pdf». In the Preamble one reads: "Considering the under­
lying conflict between immunity from jurisdiction of States and their agents and claims arising 
from international crimes". 
5 House ofLords, Jones et al. v. Ministry ofInterior Al-Mamlaka AI-Arabiya AS Saudiya (the 
Kingdom ofSaudi Arabia) et aI., 14 June 2006, [2006] UKHL 26. 
6 However, some of the Lords argued that if Pinochet was sued for civil liability, he could 
have been declared immune from the jurisdiction ofBritish Courts for the very same acts. 
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justice and compensation for the victims ofthe most serious international crimes. A 
similar situation cannot occur in most civil law countries, where the adhesion pro­
cedure (constitution de partie civile) allows the victims to apply for compensation 
in conjunction with the criminal proceedings. 
Not surprisingly, some of the Lords in the appeal decision in the Jones case 
drew attention to the contradiction ofthis complete separation ofcivil and criminal 
law in the case of torture. In a judgment subsequently quashed by the House of 
Lords, the Court of appeal had actually rejected the immunity plea by Abdul-Aziz, 
pointing out the shortcomings of making a distinction, for the purposes of apply­
ing functional immunity, between criminal and civil courts.' In the words of Lord 
Mance, "[ ... ] there is the obvious potential for anomalies, ifthe international crimi­
nal jurisdiction which exists under the Torture Convention is not matched by some 
wider parallel power to adjudicate over civil claims"." 
According to the definition of torture contained in Article 1 of the Convention 
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
(1984), acts of torture may be committed only by State officials, participation of a 
public official is in fact an element of the crime." Assuming that the acts of every 
State official, even when they may be classed as crimes of torture, must always be 
covered by the SIA or by functional immunity in civil suits is tantamount to say­
ing that there is never a chance for the victims of torture to obtain adequate com­
pensation. However, Article 14(1) of the Torture Convention provides that every 
State must "ensure in its legal system that the victim of an act of torture obtains 
redress and has an enforceable right to fair and adequate compensation". Therefore, 
granting functional immunity to State officials in civil suits before foreign domes­
tic courts thwarts the very purpose of the Convention. A similar line of reasoning 
could apply, mutatis mutandis, to many other international crimes committed by 
State officials. 
7 Court ofAppeal (Civil Division), Jones v. The Ministry ofInterior Al-Mamlaka Al-Arabiya 
AS Saudiya (the Kingdom ofSaudi Arabia) et aI., 28 October 2004, [2005] Q.B. 699. 
8 Ibid., para. 79, which subsequently reads: "The prosecution ofcrime and the pursuit ofcivil 
proceedings are in many jurisdictions (as Breyer J. observed in Sosa) very closely associated. In 
other jurisdictions like the English, Mr. Pannick's absolute distinction seems incongruous in a 
situation like that in Filartiga, if the alleged torturer was actually within and being prosecuted in 
the jurisdiction pursuant to one or other of the provisions of Article 5 of the Torture Convention. 
Despite the criminal investigation and proceedings, in respect of which no immunity could be 
claimed, the victim(s) of the alleged torture would be unable to pursue any civil claim". 
9 Art. 1(1) ofthe UN Convention against Torture reads: "For the purposes ofthis Convention, 
torture means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intention­
ally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information 
or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of 
having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on 
discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or 
with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capac­
ity". 
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It is also difficult to see why a civil suit against a State official for acts oftorture 
should implead the State more than a criminal trial.10 This consideration brings us 
back to the initially recalled analogy between the immunity of State officials and 
the immunity ofStates, and raises the question ofwhat is the real issue behind these 
inconsistencies. In this author's opinion, behind the different attitude in criminal 
or civil proceedings in the application of functional immunity of State organs sus­
pected of international crimes there is a precise will not to make an exception (not 
even to discuss one) to State immunity. It has often been said and always recalled, 
concerning the criminal liability of individuals for the most serious crimes, that 
State officials may not hide behind their States, that they may not claim to have 
been just a cog in the machine or to have conformed to instructions given by others, 
but if one follows the House ofLords' line of reasoning in Jones, one arrives at the 
conclusion that States may hide behind their organs, because only the latter, at the 
end of the day, may be prosecuted before a domestic or an international criminal 
tribunal. 
Some authors have emphasized that domestic courts are not the appro­
priate forum for adjudicating State responsibility and that granting States 
the immunity from foreign jurisdiction does not mean absolving them from 
their responsibility." However, there is not always an available inter-State fo­
rum to adjudicate on these issues. The most recent example, the contro­
versy between Bosnia and Serbia on the application of the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948), submitted to the 
International Court of Justice, lays bare the difficulties in establishing State re­
sponsibility for serious international crimes through an adjudication procedure 
that is completely separated from a criminal trial and it is very unlikely that this 
kind ofinter-States dispute settlement mechanism would compel States to provide 
adequate compensation to the victims. 
With all due respect for the House of Lords, the position taken by the Italian 
Court ofCassation is much more coherent and the judges proved courageous in ad­
vancing a logically and legally sound argument that aims to grant access to justice 
10 "Taking the basic considerations which underlie state immunity, criminal proceedings 
against individual alleged torturers involve domestic courts in "interfering in" and adjudicating 
upon the internal affairs of a foreign sovereign state. It is also natural that a state should stand 
behind its officials or agents in relation to contested allegations of torture, unless and until such 
allegations are proven. To that extent, criminal proceedings against an alleged torturer may be 
said indirectly to implead the foreign state. It is not easy to see why civil proceedings against an 
alleged individual torturer should be regarded as involving any greater interference in or a more 
objectionable form of adjudication upon the internal affairs of a foreign state. Nor is it easy to 
see why a civil claim against an individual torturer should be regarded as indirectly impleading 
the foreign state in any more objectionable respect than a criminal prosecution", Jones, cit. supra 
note 7, paras. 75-76. 
11 GATTINI, "War Crimes and State Immunity in the Ferrini Decision", lIC], 2005, pp. 224­
242. 
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to the victims of the most serious international crimes. In fact, if one contends that 
States must be immune from foreign jurisdiction even in cases where the most seri­
ous violations of international law - at least those violations entailing individual 
criminal liability, including of the high-ranking State officials - are at stake, then a 
procedural rule is allowed to hinder the fundamental right ofvictims ofthese viola­
tions to receive adequate compensation. In this respect, the latest decision of the 
Italian Court of Cassation denying immunity to the Federal Republic of Germany 
in the Milde case is very important, because it clearly made this connection pur­
porting that in order to grant respect for fundamental rights of the victims, access 
to justice ought to be granted to them." 
2. THE RATIONALE UNDERLYING FUNCTIONAL IMMUNITY OF STATE ORGANS 
A recent case decided by the Tribunal of Milan leaves some room for reflect­
ing on the scope and rationale underlying functional immunities accruing to State 
officials. 
The predominant opinion amongst States and scholars acknowledges the exist­
ence of a general rule of customary international law granting immunity to every 
State organ acting in an official capacity. According to this opinion, the foundation 
of this rule lies in attribution: acts committed by organs in their official capacity 
are to be attributed to the State, which enjoys immunity from foreign jurisdiction," 
However, State practice is not as consistent as most authors depict it," and the 
reasoning proposed in various decisions where functional immunities have been 
considered (but not always granted) is not necessarily related to matters of attribu­
tion and to the principle recalled by the formula par in parem non habet iurisdic­
tionem. 
In this landmark decision," 23 US agents and 2 Italian agents were sentenced 
for their role in the abduction and rendition to Egypt of the Muslim cleric Abu 
Omar," Immunity from criminal proceedings was granted instead to 3 CIA agents 
12 Corte di Cassazione (Sez. I penale), Criminal Proceedings against JosefMax Milde, 13 
January 2009, No. 1072, RDI, 2009, p. 619 ff., IYIL, Vol. XVIII, 2008, p. 325 (commented by 
IOVANE). 
13 See KELSEN, Principles ofInternational Law, London, 1952; MORELLI, Diritto processua­
le civile internazionale, 2nd ed., Padova, 1954; RONZITTI, Introduzione al diritto internazionale, 
2nd ed., Torino, 2007. 
14 See DE SENA, Diritto internazionale e immunita funzionale degli organi statali, Milano, 
1996; FRULLI, Immunita e crimini internazionali, Torino, 2007. 
15 Tribunale di Milano (Sez. IVpenale), Adler et al., 1 February 2010, No. 12428. 
16 In the decision it is established that there is clear evidence proving individual criminal 
liability for the alleged charges of each and every member of the CIA structure operating in Italy 
in 2003 ("a carico di tutti i componenti la struttura CIA operante in Italia nel 2003, esistono, in 
ordine al reato contestato, gravi ed univoci elementi di responsabilita penale", p. 72). 
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that were accredited as diplomatic agents at the time of the extraordinary rendition 
ofAbu Omar. The decision and the different treatment accorded to these US organs 
raise some interesting questions." 
In the first place, it is noteworthy that immunity was not granted to the major­
ity of US organs indicted, which were CIA agents. Now, for those purporting the 
existence ofa general rule on the functional immunity ofState organs, acts of sabo­
tage or espionage are not covered by the rule, on the assumption that these kind of 
activities are carried out in the territory of a foreign State (and likely attempting at 
national security) without its consent. However, the judge did not contend that he 
was applying such an exception to a general rule;18 he actually supposed that the 
abduction was expressly authorized by the US Government and he did not exclude 
that some kind of consent to the abduction ofAbu Omar was given by the Italian 
Government. 19 
The judge then examined the position of the 2 indictees that were consular 
agents at the time of the alleged facts. He concluded that the abduction of Abu 
Omar could not be covered by the functional immunity provided by the Vienna 
Convention on Consular Relations (1963) for the reason that such immunity may 
not cover serious crimes. In fact, the 1963 Convention provides consular agents 
with immunities for activities carried out in an official capacity not (or not mainly) 
because these acts are to be attributed to their State, but in order to safeguard an 
efficient performance of consular functions." Not surprisingly, ifArticle 43 is con­
17 The decision is very important because, to the best of this author's knowledge, is the first 
conviction of government agents for their involvement in extraordinary renditions. The rendi­
tions practice stands in the background of this decision, however, it must be stressed that the 
abduction of Abu Omar was classed "only" as a domestic crime because Italy - in violation of 
the obligations included in the UN Convention against Torture ratified more than 20 years ago ­
never introduced the crime of torture in the Criminal Code, thus preventing the prosecutor from 
charging CIA agents for complicity in torture. In the latter hypothesis, there would have been no 
discussion about immunity, since it is generally recognized that functional immunity never cov­
ers acts of torture or complicity in torture. 
18 Judge Magi explicitly excluded that the acts could fall under Art. 51 ofthe Italian Criminal 
Code (performance of one's duty, "adempimento del dovere"). 
19 According to Judge Magi, the fact that the abduction of Abu Omar was carried out with 
the authorization of the highest CIA agents operating in Italy suggested that Italian authorities 
(at least the secret services) were aware of the operation carried out by US agents and most 
likely approved it. However, it was impossible to examine existing evidence because of State 
secrecy invoked by the Italian Government (the relevant passage of the original decision reads: 
"L' esistenza di una autorizzazione organizzativa a livello territoriale nazionale da parte delle 
massime autorita responsabili del servizio segreto USA [... ] lascia presumere che tale attivita 
sia stata compiuta quanto meno con la conoscenza (e forse con la compiacenza) delle omologhe 
autorita nazionali, rna di tale circostanza non e stato possibile approfondire le evenienze pro­
batorie (pur esistenti) per l'apposizione/opposizione di Segreto di Stato da parte delle Autorita 
Govemative Italiane", p. 75). 
20 Art. 43(1) provides for immunity from the jurisdiction of the receiving State "in respect of 
acts performed in the exercise of consular functions". The consular functions are defined in Art. 5 
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strued in combination with Article 41 of the Convention - dealing with personal 
inviolability - it may be contended that serious crimes are never covered by con­
sular immunity." In other words, the rationale underlying the functional immunity 
rule inserted in the Convention on Consular Relations is not the protection of State 
sovereignty irrespective ofwhatever act may be accomplished by its organs in their 
official capacity, but the fulfilment of consular functions which may not include 
serious crimes. From this viewpoint, it is quite straightforward that the abduction of 
a foreign citizen (moreover a person that was under investigation by Italianjudicial 
authorities at the time of the kidnapping) and his rendition to a country where he 
has allegedly been tortured, may not fall within the performance of consular func­
tions. All the more so when evidence was brought that the accused were acting in 
their role as CIA members and not as consular agents. 
Actually the same functions-related perspective may be found in the Vienna 
Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961), although diplomatic agents also enjoy 
a different kind of immunity, that is to say personal immunity, which covers all 
their acts (including private acts) as long as they are in office. However, personal 
immunities, which only accrue to some categories of State organs because of the 
crucial relevance oftheir official position (diplomatic agents, heads ofStates, heads 
ofgovernments and ministers of foreign affairs) are procedural in nature and come 
to an end with the end of the mandate. When these organs relinquish their position, 
they may invoke, if appropriate, only functional immunity. 
In the case at hand, with respect to the position of the 3 former US diplomatic 
agents, the judge had to establish whether the alleged acts were accomplished in 
the exercise ofdiplomatic functions, in order to decide whether to grant functional 
immunity (as former diplomatic agents they could not invoke personal immunity). 
The single presiding judge chose, at least partially, a correct functions-related ap­
proach when appraising the situation of three former diplomatic agents involved in 
the affaire, but his conclusions, in this respect, are not to be shared. 
The decision, in this author's opinion, is not entirely coherent. Firstly, the judge 
argued that the abduction of Abu Omar may fall within the diplomatic functions 
provided for in Article 3 of the Convention on Diplomatic Relations, which in­
cludes "the protection ofState interests". In doing so, he properly chose to take into 
account the functions accomplished by the organs and not the issue of attribution 
of those acts to the State. As outlined above, this seems to be the correct line of 
reasoning to be followed. However the conclusion that the extraordinary rendition 
of Abu Omar can easily be classified as regular performance of diplomatic func­
of the Convention and there is a vast jurisprudence supporting a strictly fimctional interpretation 
of the immunity rules of the Convention. FRULLI, cit. supra note 14, p. 29 ff. 
21 Art. 41(1) states that "Consular officers shall not be liable to arrest or detention pending 
trial, except in the case of a grave crime and pursuant to a decision by the competent judicial 
authority". This is corrfinned by Art. 3 of Law No. 804 of 9 August 1967, implementing the 
Consular Convention in the Italian legal order. 
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tions seems highly questionable. The preparatory works, State practice and many 
authors point at a rigorous interpretation of what is to be considered a diplomatic 
function. The formula adopted by the Convention on Diplomatic Relations, ac­
cording to which "with respect to acts performed by such a person in the exercise 
ofhis functions as a member of the mission, immunity shall continue to subsist"," 
cannot be stretched to cover the secret performance of unlawful acts carried out as 
members of an intelligence agency. It is crystal-clear that the indictees were not 
acting in their capacity as diplomatic agents when organizing and carrying out the 
abduction and rendition of Abu Ornar. In addition, one has to bear in mind that 
according to Article 3(1) of the 1961 Convention "[t]he functions of a diplomatic 
mission consist, inter alia, in: [... ] b) Protecting in the receiving State the interest 
ofthe sending State and of its nationals, within the limits permitted by international 
law [... ]" (emphasis added), which was clearly not the case with the Abu Ornar's 
abduction, whatever may be the view of the US Government. An interpretation of 
the rules of the Convention on Diplomatic Relations aimed at including this kind 
of activity within the regular exercise of diplomatic functions undermines the very 
purpose of the treaty and should be fully rejected." 
Secondly, the judge ofthe Tribunal ofMilan found that he was not able to pros­
ecute the members of the Italian intelligence agency (SISMI) because the Italian 
Government invoked State secrecy, stating that court proceedings might disclose 
sensitive information which endanger national security. In this section, the judge 
refers to the possible, or even likely, existence of an agreement between the Italian 
and US Governments allowing for US CIA agents to abduct Abu Omar for the pur­
pose ofrendering him abroad and he seems to consider this supposed agreement as 
a possible additional basis for immunity. This reasoning does not seem appropriate. 
Would there be such an agreement, it would be illicit and contrary to international 
law obligations accruing both to Italy and the US. For Italy, such an agreement 
would clearly run counter to several constitutional provisions. Most importantly it 
would run against the rules protecting fundamental rights of individuals, but also 
against the provisions concerning the conclusion of treaties. Such an agreement, if 
proven, would not only deny immunity to US officials, but it would have as a con­
sequence the prosecution of Italian intelligence agents involved in the abduction 
and rendition ofAbu Omar. 
The single judge did not have much room for choice, on account of the fact 
that there was a previous decision by the Italian Constitutional Court which upheld 
22 Article 39(2) of the 1963 Convention. 
23 It was previously recalled that Italy ratified the 1984 Convention against Torture. Italy 
also signed the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance (2006) and it is a party to several human rights treaties which clearly proscribe 
acts like those occurred in the Abu Omar affaire, which can never be reconciled with respect of 
intemationallaw and which, by definition, could never be labelled as "diplomatic functions". 
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State secrecy." However, it seems unacceptable that a black curtain is drawn on the 
widely condemned practice of extraordinary renditions. The Italian judiciary has 
proved elsewhere very sensitive to international law and to the protection of fun­
damental rights and should consider that the protection of basic human rights may 
be advanced not only through the denial of immunity from jurisdiction of foreign 
States, but also by not allowing State secrecy or the political question doctrine to 
come into play and hinder the adjudication ofresponsibilities accruing to the Italian 
Government and/or government officials. 
Going back to the question posed at the beginning of this paragraph: what is 
the rationale underlying the various rules on functional immunity of State officials? 
Does this rationale change according to the different needs of States in a specific 
situation? It seems that there is a tendency to increasingly apply a strictly functions­
related rationale to the interpretation of functional immunity rules accruing to State 
officials. As a consequence, the application of immunities is to be excluded when­
ever State organs clearly act outside the scope of their functions and in contrast 
with international law (or even worse on the basis of agreements that run counter to 
international law) and it should not be possible to call into question the protection 
of State sovereignty whenever there is a highly embarrassing situation. This latter 
attitude does not help legal certainty and prevents an interpretation of international 
law rules more attuned to the protection of human rights: it is highly contradictory 
to call for the application of a procedural bar for the sake of protecting State sover­
eignty when what is at stake is the application of international rules which protect 
individuals from the abuses of State sovereignty. In a case like the one discussed 
above, where both governments presumably agreed for their organs to commit seri­
ous crimes against an individual in violation of fundamental rules of international 
law, what other forum should be competent to adjudicate if not the forum of the 
territorial State in which the crimes have been committed? 
24 Corte Costituzionale, 3 April 2009, No. 106. However, Judge Magi declared that there is 
an inherent contradiction in saying that the crime itself is not covered by State secrecy, but in 
practice it is not possible to investigate it. In his words, it amounts to a legal and logical paradox 
to affirm that the crime for which US and Italian intelligence agents are indicted is not covered 
by State secrecy and at the same time to establish that State secrecy covers the relationship 
between US and Italian Secret services and the operational structure of the Italian SISMI, even 
for the aspects related to the alleged crime ("Ammettere che vi esegreto di Stato correttamente 
opponibile all' autorita giudiziaria che riguardi i rapporti tra servizi segreti italiani e stranieri e 
assetto organizzativi e operativi del SISMI 'ancorche' collegati a un fatto reato per cui si procede, 
nel momento in cui si afIenna che per quel fatto reato non vi esegreto e nel momento in cui per 
quel medesimo fatto risultano indagati 0 imputati persone appartenenti a quei servizi stessi, co­
stituisce (a sommesso parere dello scrivente) un 'paradosso logico e giuridico' di portata assoluta 
e preoccupante", p. 46). 
